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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This cross-appeal relates to the application of the Idaho Emergency Communications Act, 
chapter 48, title 31, Idaho Code ("Act") to TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone"), the largest 
provider of prepaid wireless services in the United States. R. p. 433. Since being allowed to 
operate in Idaho, TracFone has refused to remit the statutorily required emergency 
communications fee ("911 Fee" or "Fee") to the Idaho counties and the Idaho Emergency 
Communications Commission ("IECC"). Ada County, the Idaho Association of Counties 
("IAC"), the State of Idaho, and the IECC argue that the collection and remittance requirements 
of the Act apply to TracFone, and seek to recoup the improperly withheld 911 Fees. 
In a partial summary judgment determination, the District Court, while ultimately finding 
that the Act applies to TracFone, held that TracFone is not a "wireless carrier" under Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802(15) and therefore§ 31-4802(13)(b) is inapplicable to TracFone as a matter of law. 
TracFone sought permission and subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal in which the IAC 
and Ada County cross-appeal the District Court's ruling regarding the applicability of Idaho 
Code § 31-4802(13)(b) to TracFone. Throughout this Cross-Appeal Brief, the IAC and Ada 
County will be collectively referred to as "Counties."1 
1 As the IAC did not cross-appeal the District Court's decisions as to Ada County's Motions to 
Strike, the IAC only joins Ada County in the arguments pertaining to the first Issue Presented on 
Cross-Appeal - Did the District Court err in its August 26, 2013 Memorandum Decision and 
Order re: State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed on May 17, 2013, when it made 
the determination that Sections 31-4802(13)(b) and 31-4802(15) of the Idaho Code do not apply 
to TracFone? 
1 
A. Procedural History. 
The applicable procedural history is set forth in Section I.A of Respondent Ada County's 
Brief filed herewith. Respondent Ada County's Brief, pp. 8-10. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
The applicable facts are set forth in Section I.B. of Respondent Ada County's Brief filed 
herewith. Id., pp. 1-7. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err in its August 26, 2013 Memorandum Decision and Order 
re: State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed on May 17, 2013, when it 
made the determination that Sections 31-4802(13)(b) and 31-4802(15) of the Idaho 
Code do not apply to TracFone? 
B. Did the District Court err when it failed to grant Ada County's June 21, 2013 
Objection and Motion to Strike TracFone's Affidavit Pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 56(e)? 
C. Did the District Court err when, after granting Ada County's November 12, 2013 
Objection and Motion to Strike Portions of TracFone's Affidavits in Support of its 
Motion for Reconsideration, Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f) and 
56(e), it denied Ada County's January 24, 2014 Objection and Motion to Strike 
Previously Stricken Affidavits Resubmitted in Support of TracFone's Motion for 
Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) or, in the Alternative, for Permissive 
Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 12? 
D. Are the Counties Entitled to Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal? 
III. ARGUMENT 
This Cross-Appeal is the result of a collision between form and substance. The substance 
of the Idaho Code sections at issue is clear - all "telecommunications providers" must collect 
from their customers the emergency communications fee prescribed in Idaho Code § 31-4804. 
2 
Unfortunately, the form of the statute became the focus of the District Court's legal analysis, at 
the expense of the substance of the Act. 
TracFone, and unfortunately the District Court behind it, focused on the word 
"specialized" in the definition of "wireless carrier," and asserted that irrespective of the statute's 
intent, and coupled with the outdated version of the applicable regulation, TracFone does not fit 
within the bounds of the definition. Defining itself as a "commercial radio services" provider 
rather than a "specialized radio services" provider, TracFone acts as if the word "specialized" 
has a talismanic effect that nullifies the intent behind the state statute and its linked federal 
regulation. 
TracF one also forgets one of the principal tenets of statutory interpretation - in order to 
determine the legislative intent of the Emergency Communications Act, the Act must be read as 
a whole. Unfortunately, the District Court did not adhere to this critical component when it 
analyzed whether Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)( d) and § 31-4802(15) apply to TracFone. 
Fortunately though, the Legislature thought the intent and purpose behind the Act were so 
important that it specifically codified those words in the Act itself. 
[I]t is hereby declared that the intent and purpose of the provisions of this act are 
to ... [p]rovide authority to counties and 911 service areas to impose an 
emergency communications fee on the use of telephone lines, wireless, VoIP or 
other communications services that connect an individual dialing 911 to an 
established public safety answering point . ... 
Idaho Code§ 31-4801(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
The literal words of this section unequivocally show that the Legislature intended for the 
Act to apply to any communications service that connects an individual dialing 911 to an 
3 
established public safety answering point. In other words, if a person dials 911, regardless of the 
communications service he or she uses (whether it be a standard land-line or wireless phone, or 
pre-paid or post-paid services), that use is subject to the 911 Fee and the provider of that service 
must collect and remit the Fee. 
It is important to remember that whether one uses a landline, VoIP, pre-paid or post-paid 
cellular services, there is no difference in the ability to connect to a dispatch system, and no 
difference in the type of emergency services received by the caller. Despite this fact, TracFone 
successfully (although convolutedly) convinced the District Court that it is not a "wireless 
carrier" under the Act, and is attempting convince this Court as well, with its ultimate goal of 
shifting the responsibility of funding Idaho's 911 system onto other users. The Counties 
respectfully request that this Court deny TracFone its goal. 
A. Standard of Review. 
As the Record below indicates, the District Court granted the IECC and the Counties' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and denied TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration, 
generally upholding its ruling on summary judgment. "The decision to grant or deny a request 
for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 
135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). However, since TracFone's appeal challenges the 
District Court's legal conclusions and not the actual denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, 
the Counties submit that the summary judgment standard of review is appropriate. See, Steel 
Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259 (2012). 
4 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard as 
the district court. Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,855,318 
P.3d 622, 624 (2014). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56( c ). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 
737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (citations omitted). This Court also exercises free review 
when interpreting the meaning of a statute. In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, ---, 326 P.3d 
347, 350 (2014). 
As this interlocutory appeal results from the District Court's Rule 54(b) certification, 
there are unique considerations to keep in mind. "Appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an 
interlocutory decision certified under Rule 54(b) is limited to the rulings or orders certified by 
the district court." Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 574, 261 P.3d 829, 851 (2011). 
"Because of the nature of an interlocutory appeal, we address only the precise question that was 
presented to and decided by the trial court."2 Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265 P .3d 502, 505 (2011 ). "Interlocutory appeals should not be 
2 In Verska, the plaintiffs requested that this Court address the scope of Idaho Code § 39-1392c, 
even though the plaintiffs admitted that the district court did not address that issue in its decision. 
This Court declined to address the issue. "Because there was not a ruling on that issue by the 
district court, we will not address it on appeal." Verska, 151 Idaho at 898, 265 P.3d at 511, 
citing Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 29, 244 P.3d 166, 173 
(2010). 
5 
used to guide the lower court on issues that have not yet been raised." Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 
610, 621, 315 P.3d 798, 809 (2013). 
B. The District Court Erred When It Made the Determination that Sections 
31-4802(13)(b) and 31-4802(15) of the Idaho Code Do Not Apply to TracFone. 
Although ultimately ruling that the 911 Fee collection and remittance duties of the Act 
apply to TracFone (with which the Counties obviously agree), the Counties take issue with the 
District Court's finding that, 
[B]ecause TracFone is not a cellular licensee, a personal communications service 
licensee, or [a certain specialized mobile radio provider] within the meaning of 
the Act, it is not a "wireless carrier" under section 31-4802(15) and hence section 
3 l-4802(13)(b) is inapplicable to TracFone as a matter oflaw. 
R. p. 1042. The District Court's ruling is contradictory, in that while ruling§ 31-4802(13)(b) 
and § 31-4802(15) unambiguously do not apply to TracFone, the District Court engaged in 
statutory construction (rather than statutory interpretation) by referring to and relying upon a 
definition outside the plain language of the statute. The District Court also erred by not factoring 
into its analysis the statutory words "and any successor to such rule" when finding that TracFone 
is not covered by the specifically referred to 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. For these reasons, the District 
Court's determination that TracFone is not a wireless carrier and thus not a telecommunications 
provider pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13 )(b) and § 31-4802( 15) should be reversed. 
1. Despite Finding that Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(b) and § 31-4802( 15) are not 
Ambiguous, the District Court Ignored the Directives of this Court and Looked 
Beyond the Literal Words of the Statute. 
This Court has been quite clear regarding the interpretation of unambiguous statutes. "If 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must 
6 
be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." 
Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho at 856, 318 P.3d at 625 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). Only upon a finding that a statute is ambiguous may a court engage in statutory 
construction. "Where the meaning of a statute is clear, a court is confined to follow that meaning 
and may neither add to nor take away by judicial construction." Credit Bureau of Lewiston-
Clarkston, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 117 Idaho 29, 31, 784 P.2d 885, 887 (1989). 
Here, the District Court found that Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b) and § 31-4802(15) 
unambiguously do not apply to TracFone.3 R. p. 1037. However, rather than simply applying 
the plain language of the statutes, the District Court improperly introduced and applied an 
outside definition, in direct contradiction to the instructions from this Court. 
Idaho Code § 31-4802 defines fifteen ( 15) separate terms that are used in the Act. One of 
those defined terms is "telecommunications provider" which reads:4 
(13) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing: 
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this state; or 
(b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any customer 
having a place of primary use within the state; or 
( c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of primary use 
within this state; or 
3 The Counties agree that these statutes are unambiguous. However, the District Court ultimately 
did not treat the statutes as such. 
4 There is no dispute among the parties that subsections (a) and (c) of § 31-4802(13) are 
inapplicable to this appeal and cross-appeal. While the Counties disagree with the District 
Court's analysis that subsection (b) does not apply to TracFone, should this Court uphold the 
District Court's finding that TracFone is not a wireless carrier and thus not a telecommunications 
provider under subsection (b), the Counties submit (and as the District Court found) that 
TracFone is a telecommunications provider under subsection (d). The Counties' arguments 
pertaining to the applicability of subsection (d) are found in Respondent IAC's Response Brief 
and Respondent Ada County's Response Brief filed concurrently herewith. 
7 
( d) A provider of any other communications service that connects an individual 
having either a service address or a place of primary use within this state to an 
established public safety answering point by dialing 911. 
Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13) ( emphasis added). 
The term "wireless carrier," as included in subsection (b), is further defined: "'[w]ireless 
carrier"' means a cellular licensee, a personal communications service licensee, and certain 
specialized mobile radio providers designated as covered carriers by the federal 
communications commission in 47 CFR 20.18 and any successor to such rule." Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802(15) (emphasis added). 5 The focus of the parties' (and the District Court's) analysis is 
on the latter part of this definition - "certain specialized mobile radio providers designated as 
covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 47 CFR § 20.18 and any 
successor to such rule. "6 
At the beginning of its discussion of the term "wireless carrier" and its applicability to 
TracFone, the District Court, without any analysis, made the following conclusory statement: 
5 TracFone states that it is neither a cellular licensee nor a personal communications service 
licensee, and offers the Affidavit of Sergio Rivera in support of this contention. Mr. Rivera, the 
Vice-President of Engineering at TracFone, testified that "TracFone Wireless is a reseller of 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service. Specifically, it resells Cellular Radiotelephone Service and 
Personal Communications Service .... " (emphasis added). R. p. 886. TracFone would have this 
Court believe that just because it resells these services the very services covered by the Act - it 
does not meet the definition of "wireless carrier" and therefore is exempt from its collection and 
remittance duties. This position belies the very purpose of the Act - that those who use the 911 
system in Idaho pay into that system. The fact that TracFone is a reseller of cellular service and 
personal communications service does not exempt it from the Act's requirements. 
As TracFone does not hold a license from the Federal Communications Commission, it would 
not appear that TracFone is a "cellular licensee" or a "personal communications service 
licensee," and the IECC and Counties have not argued such. However, the Counties note that the 
terms "cellular licensee" and "personal communications service licensee" are not defined in the 
Act. 
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Manifestly, "specialized mobile radio providers" is a technical term which the 
legislature intended to be defined consistently with the FCC's regulations 
pertaining to common carriers and 911 service (Title 47, Chapter I, Subchapter B, 
Part 20, Section 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations.) LC.§ 73-113(3). 
R. p. 1038. The District Court also made a second similar conclusory statement: 
As the foregoing analysis of the Act illustrates, there is no question that "certain 
specialized mobile radio providers" is a technical term that the legislature 
intended to be given the meaning ascribed to it by the FCC, and Idaho law 
requires this Court to comply when the legislature specifically defines a term. 
Id., p. 1041. 
There are two inherent problems with these conclusions. First, the District Court made 
the broad assumption that "certain specialized mobile radio providers" is in fact a technical term. 
Second, the District Court acted on that assumption by combing through the Code of Federal 
Regulations ("CFR") and borrowing an un-referenced definition of an entirely different term, in 
violation of the rules of statutory interpretation. By acting in this fashion, the District Court 
would have had no choice but to assume that the Legislature violated its constitutional directive 
that "every act or joint resolution shall be plainly worded, avoiding as far as practicable the use 
of technical terms." Idaho Const. art. III,§ 17. 
a. The District Court Erred in Determining that "Certain Specialized Mobile 
Radio Providers" is a Technical Term. 
In the proceedings before the District Court, TracFone alleged that Idaho Code 
§§ 31-4802(13) and (15) were unambiguous and, much like its briefing before this Court, cited a 
plethora of cases to the effect that no statutory construction should occur in cases where a statute 
is unambiguous. R. pp. 840-842; Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-25. TracFone then urged the District 
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Court to do exactly the opposite by asserting that it should also refer to outside sources for the 
interpretation of "technical" language. Unfortunately, the District Court agreed. 
The District Court was most likely influenced by TracFone's argument that it should not 
use the usual and ordinary meaning of the word "specialized" found in the definition of "wireless 
carrier," but rather, it should hold that "specialized" is a term of art. 7 TracFone cited several 
cases to the District Court in support of this argument. One such case is State v. Schulz, 151 
Idaho 863, 264 P. 3d 970 (2011). TracFone stated that Schultz held that "terms of art" must be 
recognized in the context of a statute. R. pp. 841-842. However, Schulz actually stated: 
"[W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at 
common law ... they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to 
the contrary." 151 Idaho at 867 (emphasis added), citing State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 340, 924 
P.2d 599, 602 (1996) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 98 S.Ct. 866, 871, 55 
7 TracFone began by citing subsection (3) of Idaho Code § 73-113, while ignoring subsection 
(1). R. p. 841. However, subsection (1) should have been the basis for the District Court's 
decision, not subsection (3). The entire statute reads: 
73-113. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES. (1) The language of a 
statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Where a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall be given 
effect without engaging in statutory construction. The literal words of a statute are 
the best guide to determining legislative intent. 
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. Interpretations which would render the statute a 
nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are disfavored. 
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined in the 
succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or definition. 
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L.Ed.2d 40, 47 (1978)). The Counties submit that whatever the term "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers" means, it was never developed as a "term of art" under the common law. 
Hence, Shulz' actual language is contrary to TracFone's position. 
TracFone then cited to the District Court FA.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012) for the 
proposition that: "[ w ]here a statutory scheme, by its 'distinctive features' indicates a 
particularized meaning for the terms used, courts must adopt those distinctive features in giving 
the statute its intended meaning." R. p. 841. A search of Cooper for the words "distinctive 
features" reveals it is only used in the following context: 
These cases and others cited by respondent stand for the unremarkable point that 
the term "actual damages" can include nonpecuniary loss. But this generic 
meaning does not establish with the requisite clarity that the Privacy Act, with its 
distinctive features, authorizes damages for mental and emotional distress. As we 
already explained, the term "actual damages" takes on different meanings in 
different contexts. 
132 S.Ct. at 1453 (emphasis added). What the Cooper Court actually said on the subject of 
statutory construction (as to the term "actual damages") was that while "it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and 
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from 
which it was taken," this proposition has little application to a legal term that itself is "far from 
clear." Id. at 1449. Needless to say, Cooper does not support TracFone's theories, since a court 
does not resort to statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous, as is the case here. 
Finally, TracFone relied upon Huffman v. CIR., 978 F.2d 1139 (C.A. 9 1992) for the 
proposition that courts should favor technical terms over common usage of words when a statute 
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plainly indicates the term should be used in the technical sense. R. p. 841. What the Huffman 
Court actually said was somewhat different: "Words of both technical and common usage are 
construed in the latter sense unless the statute plainly indicates otherwise." 978 F.2d at 1145. In 
other words, common usage is the norm, and the burden is on the party advocating usage of the 
technical term over the presumed common usage. In any event, Huffman is not the law in Idaho, 
and the statute does not provide that the word "specialized" means something more than 
"designed, trained, or fitted for one particular purpose or occupation."8 Merriam-Webster.com. 
Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/specialized. 
Further bolstering the argument that the District Court should not have considered 
"specialized mobile radio providers" to be a technical term is this Court's recent holding that 
when terms are not defined by the Legislature, the common meaning of words prevails. "[W]e 
must determine the Legislature's intent from the statutory language and ordinary meaning of the 
terms." Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 196 P.3d 353 (2008), citing Ag Servs. of Am., 
Inc., v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 P.3d 1117, 1119 (2002). See also Purco Fleet Services, 
Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 125, 90 P.3d 346, 349-350) (2004) (if words 
are in common use, they should be given the same meaning in a statute as they have among the 
people who rely on and uphold the statute). 
8 As pointed out by this Court: "Laws are enacted to be read and obeyed by the people and in 
order to reach a reasonable and sensible construction thereof, words that are in common use 
among the people should be given the same meaning in the statute as they have among the great 
mass of the people who are expected to read, obey and uphold them." City of Lewiston v. 
Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347,354,303 P.2d 680,684 (1956). 
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The Counties submit that the better (and correct) reading of the statute, and one that 
complies with the law, is that the words "certain" and "specialized" are generic, rather than 
technical. Because the interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the 
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must 
be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written." Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary 
Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P.3d 245, 247 (2013) (emphasis added). In giving these terms 
their common meaning, there is no reason to turn to outside sources, and "certain specialized 
mobile radio providers" should not be labeled a "technical term." 
b. The District Court Erred by Unilaterally Inserting a Federal Definition of 
an Entirely Different Term Into the State Statute. 
In acting on its incorrect assumption that "certain specialized mobile radio providers" is a 
technical term, the District Court inserted an unrelated federal definition into the state definition 
of "wireless carrier." The inherent problem with this action is that the Legislature did not 
include a definition of these words in the Act, nor did it reference a specific CFR section for a 
definition of this term. The District Court seems to justify its actions by the fact that the 
Legislature referenced the CFRs in § 31-4802(15). Problematically though, the referenced 
section, 4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18, does not contain a definition of the words "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers." The District Court may have assumed that the inclusion of 4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18 
in the statute was enough of a reference to allow a perusal of all of Title 4 7 to find a definition of 
"certain specialized mobile radio providers." However, this ignores the plain language of the 
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statute, which does not include "certain specialized mobile radio providers" as a technical term. 
There is nothing in the definition of "wireless carrier" or in the Act itself that supports the 
District Court's conclusion that "specialized mobile radio providers" is a technical term. 
Consequently, there is no basis to find, as the District Court did, that the Legislature intended 
those words to be "given the meaning ascribed to it by the FCC" especially when the FCC did 
not ascribe it a meaning. R. p. 1041. 
It is important to remember that the Idaho Legislature did insert the specific and only 
CFR section that it intended to incorporate into its own statute - 4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18. It makes 
perfect sense for the Legislature to have done so, since§ 20.18 concerns 911 service. Had the 
Legislature thought it necessary to specifically define "certain specialized mobile radio 
providers," it could have inserted any other CFR, including the District Court's cited CFR, or 
another definition, but it chose not to do so. 
Even if one were to follow the District Court's reasoning that "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers" is a technical term and that the Legislature intended to look to the Code of 
Federal Regulations for a definition, the definition the District Court chose to insert defines an 
entirely different term than the one referred to in the statute.9 
9 Additionally, the definition inserted by the District Court found in § 90.7 is unrelated to 
emergency communications, and is out of context with the statute itself. Title 47 of the CFRs 
concerns telecommunications. Part 20 applies to commercial mobile services, with § 20.18 in 
particular covering 911 service. The section of the CFRs that the District Court inserted into the 
statute, § 90.7, is completely unrelated, as Part 90 applies to private land mobile radio services, 
with§ 90.7 containing the definitions for that section. 
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47 C.F.R. § 90.7 contains the definition of "specialized mobile radio system." Idaho 
Code § 31-4802(15) contains the words "specialized mobile radio providers." A "system" and 
"provider" are two different things, and cannot be used interchangeably. 47 C.F.R. § 90.7 
defines "specialized mobile radio system" as a "radio system in which licensees provide land 
mobile communications services ... in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands on a commercial basis 
to entities eligible to be licensed under this Part, Federal Government entities, and individuals." 
R. p. 1040 ( emphasis added). This definition is obviously meaningless in the context of defining 
"providers." 10 
Even if these terms could be used interchangeably, and the definition of "specialized 
mobile radio system" was imported into the definition of "wireless carrier," that portion of the 
"wireless carrier" definition would become meaningless. There can never be a specialized 
mobile radio system designated as a covered carrier under § 20.18 because that section does not 
contain a reference to "specialized mobile radio system" or anything close to that term. The 
October 1, 2005 version of § 20.18 did mention and apply to "geographic area specialized 
mobile radio services" but, as of October 1, 2010, that term is no longer included. 11 As argued 
10 Throughout its arguments at the District Court, TracFone used the term "specialized mobile 
radio provider" and "specialized mobile radio system" interchangeably. The District Court made 
the same mistake. However, a "system" is defined as "a group of devices or artificial objects or 
an organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving a common 
purpose." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2014. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/system. A "provider" is "a group or company that 
provides a specified service." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 
2014. http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/provider. 
11 Again, query whether "Specialized Mobile Radio System" is even the same as "Geographic 
Area Specialized Mobile Radio Services." 
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more fully below, meaning must be attributed to the words "and any successor to such rule" 
found in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), which, contrary to TracFone's arguments, incorporates the 
updated versions of the CFR into the statute. 
Unfortunately, TracFone's technical arguments muddied the waters and made a proper 
statutory analysis by the District Court difficult. As TracFone's arguments, and the District 
Court's conclusions, were misdirected, they should not be given weight by this Court. 
2. The District Court Also Erred when it Misapplied the Words "and Any Successor 
to Such Rule" and Found that TracFone is Not Covered by 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18 is the only CFR to which the Idaho statute refers, and it is the only CFR 
that should be examined in the course of conducting the statutory interpretation analysis in this 
case. And, contrary to the District Court's holding, a review of that CFR shows that TracFone is 
covered by this federal regulation. 
The definition of "wireless carrier" directs the reader to 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 to determine 
what providers are designated as covered carriers under the regulation and, by adoption, the 
statute. Subsection (a) of 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 explains that the regulation applies to commercial 
mobile radio service ("CMRS") providers including "entities that offer voice service to 
consumers by purchasing airtime or capacity at wholesale rates from CMRS licensees." 47 
C.F.R. § 20.18(a)(2). TracFone has admitted that it is in fact a CMRS provider (R. p. 886), and 
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District Court recognized that 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(a) subjects TracFone to the FCC's 911 
requirements. 12 R. p. 1039. 
TracFone argues that because the words "specialized mobile radio providers" do not 
appear in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, they must be excluded from the Idaho statutory scheme, but this is 
irrelevant and ignores the most important clause found in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) - "and any 
successor to such rule." 
When the Legislature included "any successor to such rule" it recognized that the world 
of cellular telephone service would evolve over time. That has happened, and the Legislature's 
goal of capturing the evolving cellular service was achieved because, as shown above, the 
current version of 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 covers TracFone. Hence, TracFone is designated as a 
covered carrier by the successor to 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
Inserting such future-proofing language into a statute is common, and is certainly proper. 
In State v. Marek, 116 Idaho 580, 777 P.2d 1253 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals 
considered a claim by a convicted Native-American that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over 
his case. The claim began with the acknowledgement that the state adopted jurisdiction over 
certain Native-American affairs via Idaho Code § 67-5101, in accordance with federal Public 
Law 280. Marek asserted, much like TracFone here, that the jurisdiction should remain as it did 
when the state first adopted Public Law 280, and that there was no allowance for evolution of the 
law. The Court stated: 
12 Also, § 20 .18 has a specific section on reseller obligations, which requires resellers such as 
TracFone, independent of the underlying licensee, to provide access to basic and enhanced 911 
service. 
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Having been granted, and having accepted, jurisdiction over this general subject 
area, the state was empowered to adopt or to amend statutes within the scope of 
the grant. Thus, after 1963, it was within the state's power to amend LC.§ 18-
1501(1) by describing a more serious offense and by characterizing it as a felony 
with commensurately higher penalties. Our conclusion is consistent with a 
general principle set forth in C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION§ 51.08 (4th ed. 1972), at 517: 
A statute which refers to a subject generally adopts the law on the 
subject as of the time the law is enacted. This will include all the 
amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time 
the referenced statute was enacted. 
See also Somermeier v. District Director of Customs, 448 F.2d 1243 (9th 
Cir.1971) (California statute incorporating federal law on importation of liquor 
held to embrace subsequent amendments to federal law). 
Marek, 116 Idaho at 583, 777 P.2d at 1256. 
The "dead hand at the throttle" approach urged by Marek, and TracFone in this case, 
clearly is not the law in Idaho. The Marek Court's citation of Sutherland and Somermeier is 
particularly useful in the present appeal. As the Ninth Circuit held, "The question presented is 
whether the reference in the California statute to 'existing provisions of federal law' meant the 
federal law as it existed in 1955 or that law as it might be changed. We agree with the District 
Court that the latter was intended." Somermeier, 448 F.2d at 1244. Here, as in Somermeier, the 
Legislature expressed the clear intent that the law would change with the circumstances and be 
applied as of the time of the event, not as of the time of the original enactment. 13 
13 Although many cases on the topic speak in terms of "general reference statutes" as opposed to 
"specific reference statutes," statutes that both incorporate a specific reference and 
simultaneously state that amendments should be followed (as does § 31-4802(15)) are to be 
followed as written and are considered the equivalent of general reference statutes. "A statute of 
specific reference incorporates the provisions referred to from the statute as of the time of 
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Since the Legislature clearly intended that future amendments to 4 7 C.F .R. § 20.18 be 
applicable to the definition of "wireless carrier," TracFone meets the definition of "wireless 
carrier" and is thus a "telecommunications provider" under Idaho Code § 3 l-4802(13)(b ), and it 
was error for the District Court to find otherwise. 
3. When Properly Following the Requirements of Statutory Interpretation, the 
Literal Words of Idaho Code§§ 31-4802(13)(b) and 31-4802(15) Show that the 
Act Applies to TracFone. 
The District Court should have followed this Court's directives and looked only to the 
literal words of the statutes. Had it done so, it would have reached the conclusion that 
§ 31-4802(13)(b) and§ 31-4802(15) apply to TracFone, as it is a "wireless carrier" providing 
telecommunications service to its customers having a service address or place of primary use 
within Idaho. The Act further defines these two terms - "wireless carrier" and "place of primary 
use." The definition of "wireless carrier" is discussed extensively above. The term "place of 
primary use" is defined as ". . . the residential street address or the primary business street 
address in Idaho where the customer's use of the wireless or VoIP service primarily occurs .... " 
Idaho Code § 31-4802(12). 
As argued above, TracFone is in fact a "wireless carrier" as defined by the Act. 
TracFone also provides telecommunications services to its customers having a service address or 
place of primary use within Idaho. This is so because "TracFone has provided CMRS service 
throughout the state ofldaho continuously for over twenty years." R. p. 432. 
adoption without subsequent amendments, unless the legislature has expressly or by strong 
implication shown its intention to incorporate subsequent amendments with the statute." Stiegele 
v. State, 685 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Ala. App. 1984). 
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TracFone cannot contest the fact that its Idaho customers have a service address or place 
of primary use in Idaho, since the testimony provided by Jose Fuentes to the Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission ("IPUC") states that TracFone has the ability to track the usage rates by its 
customers. "To wit, TracFone witness Jose Fuentes conceded at the technical hearing that the 
Company has the ability to track the usage rate of its customers and 'calculate the amount of tax 
due without any problem with uniformity."' R. p. 933 ( citation omitted). 
Also, TracFone has admitted to the IPUC that it provides access lines to its customers 
with service addresses or places of primary use in Idaho. R. p. 534. The District Court has also 
acknowledged this fact. R. p. 1036. 
Since TracFone is a wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to its 
customers having a service address or place of primary use within Idaho, it meets the definitional 
requirements of § 3 l-4802(13)(b) and is therefore a "telecommunications provider" subject to 
the requirements of the Act. 
4. Even if This Court Finds that TracFone Does Not Meet the Definition of 
"Telecommunications Provider" Pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b), it 
Clearly Meets the Definition Pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(d). 
Should this Court accept TracFone's analysis as adopted by the District Court and 
determine that TracFone is not a "wireless carrier" and thus not a "telecommunications provider" 
under § 31-4802(13)(b), the Counties submit that TracFone is still a "telecommunications 
provider" under § 31-4802(13}(d}, as TracFone clearly provides communications services that 
connect its customers having either a service address or place of primary use within Idaho to an 
established public safety answering point by dialing 911. The Counties' arguments as to the 
applicability of§ 31-4802(13)(d) to TracFone are thoroughly set forth in Respondent IAC's 
Response Brief and Respondent Ada County's Response Brief, filed concurrently herewith. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed to Grant Ada County's June 21, 2013 
Objection and Motion to Strike the Baldino Affidavit Pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(1) and 56(e). 
In the proceedings before the District Court, TracFone supported several of its arguments 
with affidavits, some of which contained admissible evidence. A few of its affidavits, however, 
did not. 14 The first affidavit, entitled the Affidavit of Carolyn M. Baldino in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed by the State of Idaho and the Idaho Emergency 
Communications Commission ("Baldino Affidavit"), lacked proper foundation and/or was not 
legally relevant to TracFone's arguments. R. pp. 852-884. Ada County therefore objected and 
moved to strike portions of the Affidavit. 
1. Standard of Review. 
Regarding a court's ruling on the admissibility of affidavits, this Court explained that it: 
[A ]pplies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's 
determination of the admissibility of affidavits offered to support or oppose a 
motion for summary judgment. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 273, 281 
P.3d 103, 110 (2012). A district court does not abuse its discretion "if it (1) 
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision 
through an exercise of reason." Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 
145 Idaho 904,909, 188 P.3d 846,851 (2008)). 
Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, ---, 320 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2014). 
14 Ada County will discuss the remaining two (2) affidavits in Section III.D. below. 
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Here, the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Ada County's Motion to 
Strike the Baldino Affidavit, as the applicable law clearly shows that it is inadmissible and 
should not have been considered. 
2. The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Failed to Strike the Baldino 
Affidavit. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") and case law set out the requirements for 
summary judgment affidavits. I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that, "Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein .... " 
In Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 895 P.2d 1223 (1995), Ball, the attorney 
representing Cates, authored an affidavit to which business records were attached. Albertson's 
objected to both, arguing that the opposing attorney's affidavit did not provide proper 
foundation, and the attached evidence could not be considered. This Court explained: 
Ball's affidavit is not based upon personal knowledge as required by Rule 56(e). 
The only evidence offered through the Ball affidavit is worker's compensation 
records from Market Transport/United Express attached as exhibits to the 
affidavit. Nothing in Ball's affidavit establishes that Ball has any personal 
knowledge of either the accidents discussed in the records or the preparation and 
maintenance of the records themselves. Because the affidavit fails to establish 
that Ball is competent to testify as to the matters contained therein, this Court will 
not consider the contents of the affidavit in opposition to Albertson's affidavit ... 
It is Cates' burden to affirmatively show that Ball is competent to testify to the 
matters contained in the affidavit and that the affidavit is based on Ball's personal 
knowledge. Because the Ball affidavit fails to affirmatively establish that Ball has 
personal knowledge of the contents of the records offered through that affidavit or 
that the affidavit sets forth facts that would be admissible at trial, the contents of 
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and exhibits to that affidavit will not be considered in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Cates, 126 Idaho at 1034, 895 P. 2d at 1227. 
In June of 2013, the District Court was considering two motions for summary judgment. 
The first was TracFone's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which TracFone argued for 
dismissal of the State's and IECC's counterclaims. R. pp. 264-320. The second was the IECC, 
IAC and Ada County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the issue concerned 
whether the statutory fees were applicable to TracFone. R. pp. 330-548. TracFone supported its 
Response to the Summary Judgment Motion with two affidavits. Ada County filed no objection 
to the first affidavit, which was signed by Sergio Rivera. R. pp. 885-888. However, Ada County 
objected to the second affidavit, signed by Carolyn M. Baldino. R. pp. 852-884. 
The Baldino Affidavit explained that Ms. Baldino was a paralegal for the Greener, Burke, 
Shoemaker, and Oberrecht law firm. Baldino stated that she was "instructed by one of [her] 
supervising attorneys ... to conduct an online internet search regarding the tracking of licensing 
information that might be available on the website of the Federal Communications 
Commission." R. p. 853. The Affidavit testimony recounted her internet search, how she 
located the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") website, what she read on her 
computer screen, and the website documents she printed and attached to her Affidavit. R. pp. 
853-855. 
Ruling that the Baldino Affidavit should be admitted, the District Court explained: 
There is an objection to strike TracFone's affidavit pursuant to Idaho Rule 
Criminal [sic] Procedure 12(f) and 56(e). I am going to dispose of that one pretty 
easily. The affiant says that all she did was go to a web site, reviewed the web 
site and here's what she found. So the affidavit will be accepted and it will be 
given the weight it is entitled to as being merely what was found on the web site. 
And certainly the Rules of Evidence do recognize that we have electronic media 
that the courts can make use of certainly for the purpose of a summary judgment 
motion where they are the reflected records kept in the regular course of the 
operations of the government agency published to the public. It doesn't mean that 
that's what they actually decided finally, but that means that they are admissible 
and the Court will give them such weight as they may be entitled to. So I will 
save you some argument on that one. 
07/26/13 Tr. p. 56, 11. 6-25. 
Ada County appeals the District Court's determination, maintaining that Cates, supra, 
and I.R.C.P. 56(e) provide that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." The Baldino 
Affidavit did not show Ms. Baldino's competency to testify about FCC records. It lacked 
testimony reflecting personal knowledge about, or familiarity with, the FCC, its licensing 
requirements, how licensing information is transmitted to the FCC, or the preparation, 
maintenance and storage of the FCC records she attached to her Affidavit. 
More importantly, even if Ms. Baldino possessed the requisite personal knowledge about 
FCC licensing requirements to sponsor the records into evidence, TracFone submitted the 
Affidavit to show the absence of an officially filed FCC record. Proving the absence of a record 
requires another level of foundation beyond proving the existence of a record. 
There are two Idaho Rules of Evidence that allow proof of an absent record. Under Idaho 
Rule of Evidence ("1.R.E.") 803(7), TracFone was required to show that Ms. Baldino was 
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familiar with the FCC's record recording practices, and that "the matter was of a kind of which a 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved." The 
Affidavit did not provide that information. 
TracFone could also have utilized I.R.E. 803(10) to prove the absence of a record, but 
that rule requires a showing by Ms. Baldino that the FCC records were "regularly made and 
preserved by a public office or agency," and that "evidence in the form of a certification in 
accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that [a] diligent search failed to disclose the record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, or entry." However, Ms. Baldino failed to either 
acknowledge or certify the attached FCC records pursuant to I.R.E. 902. 
It was TracFone's burden to prove Ms. Baldino was competent to testify in support of the 
records, and to the absence of a record. Because the Baldino Affidavit failed to affirmatively 
establish that she had personal knowledge of the contents of the FCC records attached to her 
Affidavit, the attachments, like the attachments to the attorney's affidavit in Cates, supra, should 
not have been admitted into evidence. Since the District Court abused its discretion, its ruling on 
the matter should be reversed. 
D. The District Court Erred When, After Granting Ada County's November 12, 2013 
Objection and Motion to Strike the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits In Support of 
TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration, It Denied Ada County's January 24, 2014 
Objection and Motion to Strike the Previously Stricken Lloyd and Lang Affidavits 
Resubmitted in Support of TracFone's Motion for Certification Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) or, in the Alternative, for Permissive Appeal Pursuant To I.A.R. 12. 
In support of its Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court's August 26, 2013 
Memorandum, TracFone submitted additional affidavits. Ada County objected to the Affidavit 
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of Counsel [Thomas J. Lloyd] in Support of TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration ("Lloyd 
Affidavit"), and the Affidavit of Leighton W. Lang in Support of TracFone's Motion for 
Reconsideration ("Lang Affidavit"). R. pp. 1102-1672; 1068-1101. 15 
1. The Lloyd Affidavit. 
The Lloyd Affidavit included both testimony from Mr. Lloyd and attachments thereto. 
The attachment to which Ada County objected was 566 pages of minutes from various IECC 
meetings. TracFone argued that the minutes supported its argument that the Act did not apply to 
TracFone. 
Ada County objected to the admission of the minutes pursuant to I.R.E. 402, forwarding 
that any thoughts, statements, opinions or beliefs of any individual member of the IECC were not 
relevant to the legal question before the District Court. Ada County also objected to Lloyd's 
Affidavit testimony that "[i]n February, 2007, House Bill No. 123, intended to provide for a fee 
for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communication . ... " R. p. 1103 ( emphasis added). 
Ada County's objection was that while capturing VoIP fees may have been one of the 
goals behind the Legislature's 2007 amendment, it was not the only purpose. Because Lloyd's 
unsupported testimony was presented as evidence of the Legislature's intent to only to reach 
VoIP technology, the testimony appeared to be TracFone's attempt to question the District 
Court's finding in its Memorandum Decision that VoIP was not the Legislature's sole objective: 
"when the Act is read as a whole it is clear that prepaid wireless service is precisely the kind of 
'other' communications service intended to be captured by subsection ( d)." R. p. 1045. 
15 Ada County incorporates the "Standard of Review" section set forth in Section III.C. above. 
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Ada County's objection forwarded that while attorneys are expected to argue statutory 
interpretations benefitting a client, unless qualified to testify as an expert pursuant to I.R.E. 701 
or 702 and Cates, supra, an attorney may not testify as to legislative intent. Further, Lloyd failed 
to set out his particularized knowledge and/or competency to testify as to the collective intent of 
the First Regular Session of the Fifty-Ninth Idaho Legislature with regard to House Bill No. 123. 
2. The Lang Affidavit. 
Mr. Lang, Senior Vice-President and Assistant General Counsel for TracFone, testified in 
his Affidavit that an internet search led him to a pamphlet produced by the "National 911 
Program," which is "housed within the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration." 
R. p. 1069. The pamphlet contained comments and a survey of state telecommunications fee 
laws, a portion of which was attached to his Affidavit. 
Ada County objected to TracFone's submission of the pamphlet pursuant to I.R.E. 402, 
arguing that the pamphlet's notations about Idaho law were neither relevant nor appropriate legal 
authority. And, while a learned treatise may be submitted via an expert witness pursuant to 
I.R.E. 803(18), Mr. Lang's testimony did not comport with the rule which required qualifying 
Lang as an expert witness who relied upon the pamphlet, that the pamphlet was established as a 
reliable authority on Idaho law or that the pamphlet was a published treatise, periodical, or 
pamphlet on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art. Nor did TracFone present the 
pamphlet as a scholarly analysis of Idaho law or application of the same, especially since the 
pamphlet contained no evidence of the Legislature's intent. Lastly, the pamphlet was not 
submitted as authority lending to the interpretation of the plain language of the statute. 
3. The District Court Was Correct When it Initially Struck the Lloyd and Lang 
Affidavits. 
As stated above, Ada County objected and moved to strike portions of the Lloyd and 
Lang Affidavits and attachments. The District Court initially struck the Lang Affidavit at oral 
argument, explaining, "[W]ith Mr. Lang's affidavit, the Court will give it no consideration 
whatsoever and will strike it. Statements made on the internet about positions or what somebody 
feels is appropriate or how they interpret the statute is in this Court's opinion has no bearing 
upon the decision that I must make." 11/25/13 Tr. p. 142, 11. 20-25; p. 143, 1. 1. 
At the same hearing, the District Court reserved ruling on the Lloyd Affidavit, stating: 
"So the Court will consider Mr. Lloyd's affidavit only to the extent it goes to what[,] if any[,] 
deference the Court should give to any prior agency discussions. Somebody is going to have to 
show me that they adopted a position, not that they adopted minutes. Adopting minutes is not 
adopting a position." Id., p. 142, 11. 8-14. In its December 31, 2013 Memorandum Decision, the 
District Court struck the Lloyd Affidavit, finding: "The Court has now reviewed those portions 
of the minutes cited by TracFone and, finding no ... statement [collectively endorsed by the 
IECC], now fully grants the state's motion to strike the exhibit as irrelevant, since the statements 
of commission members which, although recorded in official minutes ... have no bearing on the 
primary issue presented for reconsideration .... " R. pp. 1842-1843. 
Ada County obviously agreed with the District Court's analysis that both the Lloyd and 
Lang Affidavits should be stricken. However, the District Court failed to strike the Affidavits 
for a second time, upon TracFone's resubmission. 
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4. After TracFone Resubmitted the Stricken Lloyd and Lang Affidavits, the District 
Court Abused its Discretion By Failing to Strike the Affidavits Again. 
After the District Court struck the Lang Affidavit, and just fourteen days after the Lloyd 
Affidavit was stricken, TracFone resubmitted both Affidavits, this time in support of its 
Memorandum in Support ofTracFone's Motion for Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) or, in 
the Alternative, for Permissive Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 12. TracFone explained "the evidence 
[the stricken Lang and Lloyd Affidavits] is hereby reincorporated and resubmitted to the Court to 
demonstrate the reality that opinions have historically differed on this issue, and in contrast to the 
Court's finding of clear and unambiguous application of the Act to TracFone .... " R. p. 1876, 
fn. 3 ( emphasis in original). Ada County moved to strike the resubmitted Affidavits, 
incorporating the same arguments with which the District Court first agreed when it struck the 
Affidavits days earlier. 
At the January 31, 2014, hearing on TracFone's motion for permissive appeal, the 
District Court took up Ada County's objection to the stricken and resubmitted Affidavits and 
ruled: 
I must admit, I'm certainly going to listen to the argument, but it may be - really, 
the proper description was in TracFone's reply brief that it's much ado about 
nothing. 
Because ifl grant the Rule 54(b) certification, TracFone is going to have 
before the Supreme Court the entire record that it's arguing on. And that record 
will include the affidavit and the fact that I struck it. So the Supreme Court is 
going to have it. 
So TracFone is going to have it anyway, and the State is not going to be 
able to keep it out. But I will let the State make its argument. ... 
Clearly this is an issue that's going to be before the Supreme Court, in any 
event, whether I do it now or whether I do it later after the trial. And for purposes 
of this motion, I will allow the affidavit at least to be argued to the Court. 
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01/31/14 Tr. p. 185, 11. 3-15; p. 189, 11. 18-23. 
As argued below, the Affidavits were not properly supported, nor were they relevant to 
the legal issue before the District Court, which reasoned that whether it struck the Affidavits, this 
Court would still be able to review them. The fact that an appellate court could access and 
review the Affidavits, whether stricken or not, was not the catalyst behind Ada County's motion 
to strike. The motive was to protect the record below and to ensure the District Court based its 
decision on admissible evidence. 
While there is a paucity of decisional law involving a party resubmitting stricken 
evidence to support identical arguments forwarded in the same case, in 2013 a New Jersey 
federal district court explained: 
It does not appear that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith in including this evidence; 
rather, it was simply a matter of inadvertence. Therefore, the Court will not strike 
the entirety of the expert reports. However, Plaintiffs are cautioned that when 
they re-file their motion for class certification, they cannot rely on evidence 
previously stricken from the case; Plaintiffs, as well as their experts, must comply 
with Court orders. 
In re Front Loading Washing Machines, Slip Copy, 2013 WL 346681, D.N.J., July 10, 2013, 
p. 8; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96070. The New Jersey federal district court noted that the use of 
previously stricken testimony in that case was inadvertent, but cautioned the party. Here, 
TracFone "reincorporated and resubmitted" the evidence that had been stricken days earlier, in 
support of the same argument, albeit the second time to support a motion for permissive appeal. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it admitted the previously stricken 
evidence, and Ada County submits that the District Court's reasoning that an appellate court 
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would have access to the documents regardless, 1s not a legally supportable rationale for 
admission of the objected-to evidence. 
E. The Counties Are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal. 
Should the Counties prevail on cross-appeal, they request costs and attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, and/or Idaho Appellate Rule 41. The basis for an 
award of costs and attorney fees on cross-appeal is already set forth in the contemporaneously 
filed Respondent Ada County's Brief, and in the interest of efficiency will not be repeated, but 
instead incorporated by reference. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although ultimately ruling that the 911 Fee collection and remittance duties of the 
Emergency Communications Act apply to TracFone (with which the Counties agree), the 
Counties disagree with the District Court's finding that TracFone is not a wireless carrier and 
thus not a telecommunications provider pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b ). The Counties 
believe that the District Court committed reversible error while ruling that § 31-4802( 13 )(b) and 
§ 31-4802(15) unambiguously do not apply to TracFone, and basing that ruling on an 
engagement of statutory construction (rather than statutory interpretation) by referring to and 
relying upon an unrelated definition outside the plain language of the statute. The District Court 
also erred when it glossed over the statutory words "and any successor to such rule" and found 
that TracFone is not covered by 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. 
Ada County also submits that the District Court erred when it admitted the Baldino 
Affidavit, and the resubmitted Lloyd and Lang Affidavits, into evidence in this case. 
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For these reasons, the Counties respectfully request that this Court reverse the District 
Court's determination that TracFone is not a wireless carrier pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802(15) and thus not a telecommunications provider pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802( 13)(b ), and Ada County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District 
Court's admission of the above Affidavits into evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2014. 
GREG H. BOWER 
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